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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 12-2920 
____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
LAMONT AUSTIN, 
 
Appellant 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 1-01-cr-00291-002) 
District Judge:  Honorable William W. Caldwell 
____________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
May 17, 2013 
 
Before:  SMITH, FISHER and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion Filed:  July 1, 2013) 
____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
 Lamont Austin was convicted of possession with intent to manufacture and 
distribute cocaine base (crack).  He appeals from the District Court’s denial of his motion 
for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).  Austin’s counsel seeks to 
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withdraw pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).  We will affirm and 
grant counsel’s motion to withdraw. 
I. 
 We write principally for the parties, who are familiar with the factual context and 
legal history of this case.  Therefore, we will set forth only those facts necessary to our 
analysis. 
 Pursuant to an agreement with the United States, Austin pled guilty in September 
2002 to possession with intent to manufacture and distribute at least 50 but less than 150 
grams of crack cocaine.  The District Court designated Austin a Career Offender because 
he had committed a felony controlled substance offense, he was at least eighteen years 
old, and he had at least two prior felony convictions for controlled substance offenses.  
Austin’s prior criminal history points, as well as his Career Offender designation, placed 
him in criminal history category VI. 
 Under the 2002 Sentencing Guidelines, the District Court found that Austin’s 
conviction corresponded to a Guidelines Total Offense Level of 34 (a Base Offense Level 
of 32 and a two-level firearm enhancement) and a sentencing range of 262 to 327 months.  
The District Court did not use the Career Offender Base Level (32) because it was less 
than the otherwise-applicable offense level.  A statutory maximum capped Austin’s 
sentence at 240 months.  Austin did not challenge his designation as a Career Offender or 
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seek a downward departure under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(b).  The District Court imposed 240 
months’ imprisonment and a three-year term of supervised release in May 2003. 
 In 2008, the District Court granted Austin’s first sentence reduction request based 
on the retroactive effect of Sentencing Guidelines Amendment 706, which reduced 
Austin’s Base Offense Level to 30 and the Total Offense Level to 32 – the same offense 
level applied to Career Offenders.  The new level yielded a sentencing range of 210 to 
262 months, which was limited by the 240-month statutory maximum.  The District 
Court revised Austin’s sentence to 228 months. 
 Austin filed another motion to reduce his sentence on January 19, 2012, based on 
Guidelines Amendment 750, which reduced the base offense level for 50 grams of crack1
                                              
1 Because the revised Drug Quantity Table did not correspond exactly with the 
prior Drug Quantity Table, the District Court granted Austin’s request to apply the lower 
end of the quantity range applied at the initial sentencing. 
 
to 26, which would result in a Total Offense Level to 28 when combined with two-level 
firearm enhancement.  But because he had been designated a Career Offender, Austin’s 
Total Offense Level remained at 32.  With a criminal history category of VI, this resulted 
again in an applicable guideline range of 210 to 240 months.  Austin requested that his 
sentence be reduced to 210 months.  The District Court denied Austin’s motion in June 
2012 because Amendment 750 did not actually lower his applicable guideline range, 
which was predicated on his Career Offender status. 
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 Austin directed counsel to file a notice of appeal, which was filed in July 2012.  
Austin’s counsel requested leave to withdraw, pursuant to 3d Cir. L.A.R. 109.2 and 
Anders based on counsel’s opinion that Austin’s appeal lacks any issue of arguable merit.  
Austin has not filed a pro se brief in support of his appeal. 
II. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have 
appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742. 
 Counsel may file a motion to withdraw representation under Anders if, upon a 
review of the district court’s record, he or she is “persuaded that the appeal presents no 
issue of even arguable merit.”  3d Cir. L.A.R. 109.2(a).  When counsel submits an Anders 
brief, we consider:  (1) whether counsel thoroughly examined the record in search of 
appealable issues and explained why the issues are frivolous; and (2) whether our 
independent review of the record presents any issues that are not frivolous.  United States 
v. Youla, 241 F.3d 296, 300 (3d Cir. 2001).  Independent review of the record need not be 
“a complete scouring of the record by the courts and identification of the issues for the 
defendant.”  Id. at 301.  Instead, “where the Anders brief initially appears adequate on its 
face, the proper course is for the appellate court to be guided in reviewing the record by 
the Anders brief itself.”  Id. 
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 “We review a court’s ultimate decision whether to grant or deny a defendant’s 
motion to reduce sentence under § 3582(c)(2) for abuse of discretion.”  United States v. 
Mateo, 560 F.3d 152, 154 (3d Cir. 2009). 
III. 
 We first consider whether counsel thoroughly examined the record in search of 
appealable issues and explained why those issues are frivolous.  After reviewing the 
record in this appeal, we conclude that counsel has satisfied the requirements of Local 
Rule 109.2(a).  In his brief, counsel identified the possible issue for appeal and submitted 
a review of the law and an appendix with the salient portions of the record.  Furthermore, 
counsel has set forth in his brief why the issue raised is frivolous.  These documents 
demonstrate that counsel searched the record and the law in service of his client. 
 Counsel’s brief identifies only one potentially appealable issue:  the denial of 
Austin’s motion to reduce his sentence under § 3582(c)(2), based on the retroactive 
application of Amendment 750 to the Sentencing Guidelines.  We agree that this issue 
lacks any merit. 
Amendment 750 does not have the effect of lowering Austin’s applicable 
guideline range because, despite the changes to crack-related sentences, his sentencing 
range remained as 210 to 240 months because of his designation as a Career Offender.  
Because the Amendment does not change Austin’s sentencing range, § 3582(c)(2) does 
not authorize a reduction in his sentence.  See Mateo, 560 F.3d at 155.  We do not find 
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any other non-frivolous avenues for appeal in our review of the record, as guided by the 
Anders brief. 
IV. 
 For the reasons set forth above, we will grant counsel’s Anders motion and affirm 
the judgment of the District Court. 
